Royal Rumble: Analysis of Royal Ransomware

The Royal ransomware group emerged in early 2022 and has gained momentum since the middle of the year. Its ransomware, which the group deploys through different TTPs, has impacted multiple organizations across the globe. The group itself is suspected of consisting of former members of other ransomware groups, based on similarities researchers have observed between Royal ransomware and other ransomware operators.

Key Findings

  • Unique approach to evade anti-ransomware defenses: Royal ransomware expands the concept of partial encryption, which means it has the ability to encrypt a pre-determined portion of the file content and base its partial encryption on a flexible percentage encryption, which makes detection more challenging for anti-ransomware solutions.

  • Multi-threaded ransomware: Royal ransomware employs multiple threads in order to accelerate the encryption process.

  • Global ransomware operation: Royal ransomware operates around the world, and reportedly on its own. The group doesn’t appear to use ransomware-as-a-service or to target a specific sector or country.

  • Different methods of deployment: Royal ransomware initially starts and deploys in different ways, as described in this report.


The Royal ransomware group was first discovered in early 2022. At the time, it utilized third-party ransomware, such as BlackCat and custom Zeon ransomware. Since September 2022, the group has started to use its own ransomware. In November 2022, Royal ransomware was reported to be the most prolific ransomware in the e-crime landscape, overtaking Lockbit for the first time in more than a year.

Royal ransomware operations start in different ways. One method is through phishing campaigns and uses one of the common e-crime threat loaders, reportedly BATLOADER and Qbot. The threat loader then downloads a Cobalt Strike payload to continue the malicious operation within the infected environment. This tactic is commonly used by other ransomware operations, including Qbot and BlackBasta.

Since mid-September, the ransomware group has gained momentum and added dozens of victims to its website. The group does not seem to focus on a specific sector, and its victims vary from industrial companies to insurance companies, and more. Although the majority of the group’s victims are based in the U.S., one of its higher profile victims was the Silverstone Circuit, a motor racing circuit in England.

Royal Ransomware Image 1Screenshot from Royal Ransomware website showing Silverstone Circuit as a victim

Multiple reports have noted resemblances between the Royal Ransomware group and Conti, including similarities between the ransom notes each group uses (particularly in Royal’s early stages) and the use of callback phishing attacks. In our research, we have identified additional similarities, such as resemblances in the encryption process decision factors. However, these similarities are not yet clear enough to confirm a direct connection between the two groups.


Setting up the ransomware

When executing, Royal ransomware can take three arguments in its command line:

  • -path [optional]: The path to be encrypted

  • -ep [optional]: The number that represents the percentage of the file that will be encrypted

  • -id: A 32-digit array

The encryption process decision tree is dependent on the command line arguments. Therefore, factors such as encryption speed, file corruption, and potential detection are directly affected. If no “-id” parameter is given in the command line, the ransomware won’t run.

Royal Ransomware Image 2Royal ransomware command line arguments

After validating the command line, Royal ransomware will attempt to delete shadow copy backups using the process Vssadmin.exe, with the command line “delete shadows /all /quiet”.

Royal Ransomware Image 3Royal ransomware deleting shadow copies

The deletion of the shadow copy can also be seen via the Cybereason Defense Platform, which identifies the activity as ransomware behavior in the image below.

Royal Ransomware Image 4Cybereason Defense Platform identifies deletion of shadow copies

Once the backups have been deleted, Royal ransomware will set its exclusion paths (the files or directories spared from file encryption). The following file extensions will be excluded from being encrypted:

  • .exe

  • .dll

  • .bat

  • .lnk


  • .royal

Royal Ransomware Image 5>Royal ransomware setting the extension exclusion list

Next, the ransomware will set the list of directories to be excluded from the encryption process. These directories are the ones that contain the following strings:

  • Windows

  • Royal Perflogs

  • Tor browser

  • Boot $recycle.bin

  • Windows.old

  • $window.~ws

  • $windows.~bt

  • Mozilla

  • Google

Royal Ransomware Image 6Royal ransomware setting the directories exclusion list

After setting the directories to be excluded from encryption, the ransomware then uses the API call Socket to establish a TCP socket and WSAIoctl to invoke a handler for LPFN_CONNECTEX to use the ConnectEx function.

Royal Ransomware Image 7Royal Ransomware retrieving ConnectEx function

After the initial part of setting the ransomware, Royal ransomware will create two threads: one for writing the ransom note on non-excluded directories and another for file encryption, in addition to a network scanning option.


As mentioned, if no path is given in the command line arguments, Royal ransomware will start with the following steps:

First, the ransomware will scan the network interfaces, and if possible, retrieve the different IP addresses for the target machine(s), using the API call GetIpAddrTable. It will specifically search for IP addresses that start with “192. / 10. / 100. / 172.”

Royal Ransomware Image 8Network scanning

Second, Royal ransomware will establish a socket using the API WSASocketW and will associate it with a completion port using CreateIoCompletionPort. It then will use the API call htons to set the port to SMB, and eventually try to connect to the instructed IP addresses via the LPFN_CONNECTEX callback function.

Royal Ransomware Image 9Using ConnectEx

Third, the ransomware will enumerate the shared resources of the given IP addresses using the API call NetShareEnum. If a shared resource is one of “\\<IP_Address>\ADMIN$” or “\\<IP_Address>\IPC$”, the ransomware will not encrypt it.

Royal Ransomware Image 10Enumerating network resources and avoiding ADMIN$ and IPC$ file shares


Royal ransomware encryption is multi-threaded. To choose the number of running threads, the ransomware will use the API call GetNativeSystemInfo to collect the number of processors in a machine. It will then multiply the result by two and will create the appropriate number of threads accordingly.

Royal Ransomware Image 11Creating encryption threads

Next, the ransomware will set the RSA public key, which is embedded in the binary in plain text and will be used for encrypting the AES key.

>Royal Ransomware Image 12RSA public key

Before starting the encryption process, Royal ransomware uses the Windows Restart Manager to check if any of the targeted files to be encrypted are being used or blocked by other applications or services. Notably, other ransomware groups including Conti, Babuk, and Lockbit use Restart Manager for the same purpose. Royal then uses the API calls RmStartSession to start the session, RmRegisterResources to register the resources (i.e., the targeted files), RmGetList to verify which applications or services are using the resource (excluding “explorer.exe”), and RmShutDown to kill those applications and services using the resource.

Royal Ransomware Image 13Royal ransomware killing processes

Finally, the encryption method will be determined by the size of the file that will be encrypted and in consideration of the -ep parameter.

  • If the file size is smaller than 5.245 MB or the -ep argument equals 100:, the entire file will be encrypted.

  • If the file size is larger than 5.245 MB and the -ep argument is not equal to 100:, the file will be encrypted approximately by the percentage of the -ep argument.

  • If the file size is larger than 5.245 MB and no -ep argument is given, 50% of the file will be encrypted.

Royal Ransomware Image 14Decision making in encryption

When a targeted file is being encrypted, the ransomware calculates the percentage to encrypt and divides the file content (encrypted and unencrypted) into equal segments. The fragmentation and possibly low percentage of encrypted file content that results lowers the chance of being detected by anti-ransomware solutions.

In the following test, we can see the comparison between the encryption of the same file (larger than 5.245 MB) with different encryption percentages (-ep argument). The image on the left represents an -ep argument of 50 and the image on the right represents an -ep argument of 10.

Royal Ransomware Image 15
PortexAnalyzer ep 50 vs. ep 10

In addition to the file being encrypted, Royal ransomware will save 532 bytes at the end of each file and writes the following:

  • 512 bytes for randomly generated encryption key

  • 8 bytes for file size of the encrypted file

  • 8 bytes for the used ep parameter

Royal Ransomware Image 16

While partial encryption is not new, most ransomware base their partial encryption only on the file size, then encrypt a set percentage of the file  the same way, each time. In contrast, Royal ransomware lets the operator choose a specific percentage and lower the amount of encrypted data even if the file size is large. This ability to change the amount of the file to be encrypted gives Royal ransomware an advantage when it comes to evading detection by security products.

It’s worth highlighting that Conti ransomware also chooses the file size of 5.24 MB as its threshold for partial encryption. When a file was larger than 5.24MB, Conti would encrypt 50% of the file in a divided manner, much like Royal ransomware. This similarity raises the question of whether the Royal ransomware authors have a connection to the Conti group, but on its own, it is not strong enough to suggest a direct or definitive connection.

As for the encryption algorithm, Royal ransomware uses the OpenSSL library and the AES256 algorithm. Similar to other ransomware, it first reads the targeted file using ReadFile, then it encrypts the content and writes the encrypted data in the designated location using WriteFile and SetFilePointerEx. After finishing encryption, the file extension changes to “.royal” using the API call MoveFileExW.

Royal Ransomware Image 17Royal ransomware appending .royal extension to the files it encrypts


During the entire Royal ransomware process, the ransomware creates an additional thread to retrieve the logical drives using the API call GetLogicalDrives. It then writes the ransom note with the name “README.TXT” in every directory that is not in its exclusion list.

Royal Ransomware Image 18

Royal Ransomware creating the ransom note

Eventually, an encrypted directory will look like this

Royal Ransomware Image 19Example of a folder affected by royal ransomware


The image below illustrates the entire encryption process decision tree:

Royal Ransomware Image 20Royal ransomware encryption process decision tree


When it comes to partial encryption, Royal ransomware seems to give the ransomware operator a more flexible solution for evading detection compared to most ransomware. We assume this flexibility and the evasion potential it enables was a design goal for the creators of Royal ransomware.

As with some reports mentioned above, some ideas that were implemented in Conti ransomware can be found in Royal ransomware.


The Cybereason Defense Platform is able to detect and prevent Royal ransomware infections using multi-layer malware protection that leverages threat intelligence, machine learning, anti-ransomware, next-gen antivirus (NGAV), and Variant Payload Prevention capabilities.

Royal Ransomware Image 21Cybereason Defense Platform showing the Royal ransomware triggered a “MalOp”


The Cybereason GSOC & Security Research teams recommend the following actions in the Cybereason Defense Platform:

  • Enable Application Control to block the execution of malicious files.

  • Enable Anti-Ransomware in your environment’s policies, set the Anti-Ransomware mode to Prevent, and enable Shadow Copy detection to ensure maximum protection against ransomware.

  • Enable Variant Payload Prevention with prevent mode on Cybereason Behavioral execution prevention.

  • To hunt proactively, use the Investigation screen in the Cybereason Defense Platform and the queries in the Hunting Queries section to search for machines that are potentially infected with Royal Ransomware.

    • Based on the search results, take further remediation actions, such as isolating the infected machines and deleting the payload file.

Cybereason is dedicated to teaming with defenders to end cyber attacks from endpoints to the enterprise to everywhere. Schedule a demo today to learn how your organization can benefit from an operation-centric approach to security.



Technique or Sub-technique

TA0005: Discovery

T1083: File and Directory Discovery

TA0007: Discovery

T1016: System Network Configuration Discovery

TA0007: Discovery

T1046: Network Service Discovery

TA0007: Discovery

T1057: Process Discovery

TA0007: Discovery

T1082: System Information Discovery

TA0007: Discovery

T1135: Network Share Discovery

TA0040: Impact

T1486: Data Encrypted for Impact

TA0040: Impact

T1489: Service Stop

TA0040: Impact

T1490: Inhibit System Recovery

TA0002: Execution

T1059: Command and Scripting Interpreter




Indicator type




Royal Ransomware Binary



Royal Ransomware Binary



Royal Ransomware Binary



Royal Ransomware Binary



Royal Ransomware Binary



Royal Ransomware Binary



Royal Ransomware Binary



Royal Ransomware Binary


Eli Salem, Security & Malware Researcher, Cybereason Global SOC

Eli SalemEli is a lead threat hunter and malware reverse engineer at Cybereason. He has worked in the private sector of the cybersecurity industry since 2017. In his free time, he publishes articles about malware research and threat hunting. 


Alon Laufer, Senior Security Analyst, Cybereason Global SOC 

Alon LauferAlon Laufer is a Senior Security Analyst with the Cybereason Global SOC team. Alon analyzes critical incidents. He began his career in the Israeli Air Force where he was responsible for protecting critical infrastructure. Alon is interested in malware analysis, digital forensics, and incident response.


 Mark Tsipershtein, Security Operations Analyst at Cybereason

Mark TsipershteinMark Tsipershtein, a cyber security analyst at the Cybereason Security Research Team, focuses on analysis automation and infrastructure. Mark has more than 20 years of experience in SQA, automation, and security testing.

About the Author

Cybereason Global SOC & Cybereason Security Research Teams