



# **TTP Briefing:**

## **January - May**

## **2025**

# Methodology

This TTP Briefing is based on threat intelligence collected directly from Cybereason incident response engagements worldwide, which are technology-agnostic, and supplemented with data from a selection of Global Security Operations Center (GSOC) detections. This approach reflects the attack trends, techniques, and procedures that Cybereason is currently seeing in the wild, and provides a realistic view of the evolving threat landscape for our clients.

# Data Overview

## Top 3 Impacted Industries

- Financial Services (18%)
- Manufacturing (16%)
- Technology & Software (11%)

## Top 3 Threat Incident Types

- Business email Compromise (41%)
- Ransomware (28%)
- Cloud Intrusion (13%)

## Top 3 Initial Intrusion Vectors

- Phishing/Social Engineering (46%)
- Valid Accounts /Credential Abuse (16%)
- Exploited Vulnerabilities (14%)

# KEY TAKEAWAYS

H1 2025

## **MOST (76%) ORGANIZATIONS HAD EDR IN PLACE**

Additionally, EDR bypass techniques were only identified in rare (< 5%) instances. Despite that, attackers still succeeded in compromising the victim.

Most commonly, EDR triggered alerts but organizations didn't properly respond.

## **ONLY 36% OF BEC VICTIMS HAD MFA ON COMPROMISED ACCOUNTS**


Within BEC cases that had MFA, investigations uncovered a high rate of successful MFA bypass (> 50%) largely thanks to readily available sophisticated phishing kits that capture MFA tokens and credentials.

## **DETECTION EVASION AND THIRD-PARTIES ADD COMPLEXITY:**

Living-off-the-land Binaries (LOLBins) were leveraged in 18% of incidents

In 7% of engagements, a third-party incident contributed to or caused the incident


# Top 10 Impacted Industries






# Company Size

*Based on revenue*




# Most Common Incident Types



# Ransomware

## Attack Type Distribution



## Top Observed Variants


High Activity:	Others:
Akira	Bootkit
Inc	Cactus
Play	BlackNevas
SafePay	GandCrab
Medusa	Makop
Qilin	Ransomhouse
	Mimic
	SECP0



# Dwell Time

## From Initial Intrusion to IR Kickoff

*Measured from the initial date of compromise until Cybereason IR team engagement.*



### Dwell Time Benchmarks:

0-2 Days: Exceptional

3-10 Days: Above Average

11-30 Days: Below Average

31+ Days: Poor


*\* Only applies to Cybereason Consulting clients, excludes MDR clients*

# Most Commonly Observed CVEs


CVE	Impacted Product
<b>CVE-2024-55956</b>	Cleo Harmony
<b>CVE-2022-41335</b>	Fortinet FortiOS
<b>CVE-2022-42475</b>	FortiOS SSL-VPN
<b>CVE-2024-57727</b>	SimpleHelp Remote Support Software
<b>CVE-2023-34362</b>	MOVEit Transfer
<b>CVE-2016-0099</b>	Microsoft Windows Secondary Logon Elevation of Privilege
<b>CVE-2023-20269</b>	CISCO Adaptive Security Appliance

# Trends Across The Intrusion Path

*Five Stages of Distinct Activity*



# 1 - Initial Intrusion Vector




## 2 - Persistence

In cases where Persistence was observed, the following Malware/Tools/Techniques were most commonly leveraged

Name	Description
<b>AnyDesk</b>	Remote access (desktop) software
<b>Webshell</b>	Remote access and command script
<b>Level RMM</b>	Remote access (desktop) and monitoring software
<b>psexecsvc.exe</b>	Remote command execution (LOLBin)
<b>Meshagent</b>	Remote access (desktop) software
<b>ScreenConnect</b>	Remote access (desktop) software
<b>SplashTop</b>	Remote access (desktop) software
<b>Abuse of VPN</b>	Technique to leverage VPN access
<b>schtasks.exe</b>	Scheduled Tasks / Job scheduler (LOLBin)

# 3 - Escalation

In cases where Escalation was observed:




Observed Tools/Techniques used for Escalation:

Name	Description
Mimikatz	Credential stealer
LSASS Dump	Technique for extracting credentials
TruffleHog	Tool to scan code repositories
OpenSSH Authentication Agent	Program that stores private keys for SSH authentication
Net User Command	Command to manage user accounts



## 4 - Data at Risk


In cases where Data at Risk was observed:



Observed Tools/Techniques for Data at Risk:

Name	Description
<b>RClone</b>	Command-line program for file management
<b>WinSCP</b>	Open-source SFTP client
<b>couchdrop.io</b>	SFTP server and client
<b>WinRAR</b>	Software for compressing and archiving files
<b>Exfiltration Over C2 Channel</b>	Technique to transfer data over C2 channel

## 5 - Threat Actor End Goal



A wireframe illustration of a mechanical claw or gripper, composed of several segments with curved, pincer-like ends. The structure is rendered in a light gray wireframe style against a dark background, showing internal mechanical details like joints and actuators.

# About Cybereason

# TRUSTED INCIDENT RESPONSE TEAM

FRONTLINE EXPERTISE TO ELEVATE YOUR CYBER PREPAREDNESS AND RESILIENCE



## BATTLE-TESTED EXPERTISE

**7000+**

Incident response investigations

**200K+**

Hours of offensive security engagements

**~500**

Tabletop exercises orchestrated

**Relationships with 100s of law firms and insurance carriers**



## HOLISTIC EXPOSURE MANAGEMENT

**300+**

experts versed in infrastructure, applications, systems, and endpoints including OT/IoT and emerging tech

**60+ elite DFIR investigators**

with eDiscovery, managed review, breach notification and expert witness expertise



## ELITE THREAT INTEL & SECURITY RESEARCH

**30K+**

**vulnerabilities**  
discovered annually


**6M+ endpoints**  
under management

**MXDR platform**

able to ingest 100s of cloud, SaaS, EDR telemetry

# PREPAREDNESS & RESILIENCE SOLUTIONS

50+ SERVICES TO HANDLE THE ENTIRE LIFECYCLE OF A CYBER INCIDENT







**cybereason**

24x7 expert assistance via [response@cybereason.com](mailto:response@cybereason.com)